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ABSTRACT 
  This Note assesses the need for specialized review in the federal 
circuit courts of noncapital habeas cases brought by state prisoners 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. It first argues that the complexity of federal 
habeas law, the substantial disuniformity between circuits, the 
conflicting visions proffered by the Warren Court’s habeas 
jurisprudence and Congress’s recent statutory enactments—together 
with the greatest stakes possible at issue, liberty—are all factors 
warranting the creation of a national court of appeals that would hear 
only habeas cases. Recognizing, however, that creating such a court is 
a low priority for Congress at best and simply unfeasible at worst, this 
Note also makes another recommendation for injecting specialized 
review into appellate adjudication. Specifically, the circuit courts’ use 
of line staff attorneys to screen petitions can be much improved by 
creating a career staff attorney position dedicated solely to review of 
noncapital § 2254 cases. A formal position will attract better 
candidates, have lower rates of turnover, and concentrate experience 
and expertise to the benefit of judges and litigants. 
INTRODUCTION 
In response to the recent statutory and judge-made restrictions 
on federal habeas review,1 scholars have suggested widely diverging 
proposals for its reformation. Some have advocated for process 
reforms, such as creating a constitutional right to counsel in 
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 1. For a brief history of the Great Writ, see infra Part I.A.1. 
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postconviction proceedings2 or a national court of appeals for the 
direct review of all federal- and state-court convictions that would 
lessen the pressure on collateral relief.3 Others have advanced 
proposals for replacing current law and starting anew with more 
focused legislation4 or approaching the writ from a different 
perspective.5 Two scholars have proposed eliminating federal habeas 
review for all but two categories of noncapital cases, arguing that 
because the chances of success are so low for these claimants, it is 
more useful to devote these resources to ensuring fair process at the 
state level.6 
Few scholars, however, have looked at the mechanisms by which 
federal courts process and decide habeas claims as a means to ensure 
greater accuracy and improve efficiency in their adjudication.7 This 
 
 2. See, e.g., Emily Garcia Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators: The 
Post-AEDPA Access-to-the-Courts Demand for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal 
Habeas Corpus, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1219 (2012).  
 3. Clement F. Haynsworth Jr., Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal 
Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 598 (1974). Specifically, then-Chief Judge 
Haynsworth of the Fourth Circuit offered the following:  
My own modest proposal is essentially abandonment of primary reliance upon 
collateral review of federal questions arising in criminal prosecutions and the 
substitution of an efficient system for prompt direct review . . . requir[ing] the 
creation of a new national court of appeals to review convictions in the federal and 
state judicial systems.  
Id. (footnote omitted). His proposal was based largely on concerns stemming from the 
burgeoning federal dockets and the changes wrought in the writ by the Supreme Court in the 
previous decade. Id. at 597–98, 600–02.  
 4. See, e.g., Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign A Leaner, Cleaner Writ of 
Habeas Corpus, 49 DUKE L.J. 947, 950–1040 (2000) (discussing how Congress can narrow the 
scope of the writ by limiting the substantive claims to those underlying the purpose of federal 
habeas review rather than by setting up procedural hurdles).  
 5. See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 86 (2012) (arguing that the more important purpose of federal habeas 
review of state-court convictions is “ensuring that the state court process is fundamentally fair,” 
not overturning wrongful convictions).  
 6. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal 
Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 819–821, 823–24 (2009). For one response to this argument, see 
John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A 
Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 435 (2011). 
 7. There has been some scholarship evaluating case-management practices in individual 
federal district courts. See generally, e.g., Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, 
Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475 
(2002) (reviewing the response by the Eastern District of New York to a rise in the number of 
pro se claims); Kim Dayton, Case Management in the Eastern District of Virginia, 26 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 445 (1992) (analyzing the value of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990).  
  Any discussion of the processing of habeas corpus claims by the federal courts of 
appeals, however, has been in the context of evaluating their mechanisms for processing all 
JINDAL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2016  7:29 AM 
2016] PROCESS MATTERS 1057 
Note seeks to explore this proposition in relation to noncapital 
habeas claims brought by state prisoners in federal courts of appeals 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. It focuses on federal review of noncapital 
state convictions because these make up the majority of habeas 
appeals.8 This Note also focuses on appellate review for three reasons. 
First, the practices of the federal district courts are too varied for 
suitable analysis and comparison.9 Second, as petitioners seeking to 
file second or successive petitions must request certificates of 
appealability from circuit courts—the grant or denial of which is not 
reviewable on certiorari to the Supreme Court10—the appellate courts 
enjoy a special role, quite literally acting as guards to the courthouse 
and to justice.11 Lastly, because the Supreme Court “grants certiorari 
in only a fraction of the habeas cases entertained by the lower federal 
courts,” the appellate courts are courts of last resort for many 
litigants.12 Due to the heightened stakes—liberty, not mere property, 
and the potential to correct decades-long injustices—it is particularly 
important that they decide these cases accurately. 
 
claims and has focused on the perceived inequities of these mechanisms. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. 
RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF 
APPEALS IN CRISIS 4, 12, 103–04, 182 (2012) (discussing the role of the Warren Court’s 
expansion of federal habeas review in increasing federal courts’ caseloads and leading to the 
development of case-management practices, including limited publication, hiring of staff 
attorneys, and denial of oral arguments, all of which have resulted in the “screen[ing] out of the 
traditional process those cases that are the least likely to draw the attention of any powerful 
observer,” including “habeas corpus cases”); Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The 
Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1444–64 (2004) (tracing 
the origins of “unpublication” to “the federal judiciary’s anxiety about floods of civil rights and 
pro se prisoner postconviction appeals litigation in the 1960s”). Recently, while responding to 
critiques of federal appellate case-management practices, Professor Marin Levy suggested that 
for some types of cases, staff attorney review, if specialized, could in fact be beneficial to 
litigants. Marin K. Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386, 2410–11 (2014) 
[hereinafter Levy, Judging Justice] (reviewing RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra); Marin K. Levy, 
Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time 
Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 443–44 (2013) 
[hereinafter Levy, Judicial Attention]. 
 8. See infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 9. Compare, e.g., Bloom & Hershkoff, supra note 7, at 495–97, with Dayton, supra note 7, 
at 466–69 (describing how the Eastern District of New York and the Eastern District of 
Virginia, respectively, manage their pro se docket). 
 10. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (2012). 
 11. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996). 
 12. John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 288 
(2006). 
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This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I argues that noncapital 
habeas claims are suitable for specialized review13 because the 
substantive law of habeas corpus exhibits the characteristics that have 
been used to justify specialized review in other areas of law. Part II 
analyzes the advantages and drawbacks of one form that specialized 
review can take—a specialized court, such as the United States Tax 
Court or the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, featuring 
adjudication by expert judges. This Part closes by assessing the 
feasibility of such a court, determining that due to political 
differences, it is unlikely that such a court would ever be created by 
Congress. As a result, the final Part presents an alternate form of 
specialized review—review undertaken by staff attorneys with 
subject-matter expertise in habeas law. It outlines a proposal to 
structure such review and addresses arguments against such review. 
This Note concludes that specialized review by staff attorneys can 
ensure that habeas petitions receive the attention, time, and care they 
deserve without overburdening the appellate court.  
I.  NONCAPITAL HABEAS CLAIMS ARE SUITABLE  
FOR SPECIALIZED REVIEW 
When the federal court system experiences an exponential 
increase in caseload, scholars often respond by proposing specialized 
courts with sole jurisdiction over particular types of cases or areas of 
law.14 The burden placed on the federal courts’ dockets by habeas 
petitions is well known and accounted for.15 This Part establishes that 
there are additional factors that justify creating a specialized appeals 
 
 13. My use of this term is limited to the idea that at some point after a claim is filed, it is 
evaluated by someone with expertise in habeas corpus. Thus it includes both specialized 
processing mechanisms (the screening and reviewing of claims by expert staff attorneys) and 
specialized adjudication (adjudication by expert judges).  
 14. See, e.g., Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 745, 745 
(1981) (suggesting a “trial-level specialist as an option in difficult cases”); Stephen J. Safranek, 
Curbing the Fees of the Class Action Lawyers in Light of City of Burlington, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 
1301, 1337–39 (1995) (proposing a specialized court to hear class-action cases). For an argument 
against specialized appellate judges, see Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals 
Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 761, 777–89 (1983).  
 15.  See, e.g., infra notes 20–21, 91 (discussing “abuse” of the Great Writ); see also infra 
notes 83–84 and accompanying text (reporting the percentage of the federal appeals courts’ 
caseload composed of § 2254 and § 2255 habeas petitions). 
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court to hear only habeas petitions: (1) complexity; (2) a need for 
uniformity and coherence;16 and (3) a special concern for accuracy.  
A. Complexity 
This Section begins with a brief history of the writ of habeas 
corpus and introduces the various sources of law that govern it. It 
then reviews the maze-like complexity that is the hallmark of modern 
federal habeas law. 
1. The History of the Great Writ.  Much of the restrictive nature 
of federal habeas review is recent. Though, historically, the Great 
Writ of Liberty was only granted “sparingly,”17 Congress expanded it 
in 1867 by permitting federal review of state-court convictions.18 
Access to the writ was expanded again in the 1950s and 1960s, this 
time by the Supreme Court.19 Notably, both expansions came at a 
time when there was danger of state courts under-enforcing federal 
rights, first after the Civil War and then during the civil rights 
movement. 
 
 16. Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 
U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1116–17, 1120 (1990). Professor Richard Revesz provides a thorough 
review of the literature that identifies complexity, uniformity, and coherence as factors justifying 
specialized review. Id. at 1116–20. He also discusses two other reasons: the desire to remove 
adjudicative functions from administrative agencies to specialized courts and the “sharp 
increase in the volume of litigation” that occurred in the 1980s. Id. at 1118, 1120. The first 
reason is “exclusive to the administrative context,” id. at 1115, and is consequently not included 
here. Revesz’s second reason is less persuasive today in light of the recent decline in federal 
appellate filings. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT 
STATISTICS—SUMMARY (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18451/download [http://perma.cc/
K4RC-APZA] (showing a declining trend in overall number of appellate filings since 2010 for 
all circuits except for the D.C. Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, which have seen filings increase by 
2.1 and 1.2 percent, respectively); see also Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014, ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-
caseload-statistics-2014 [https://perma.cc/5BCQ-4BW5] (reporting a 15 percent decline in total 
appeals court filings since 2005).  
 17. Lynn Adelman, Federal Habeas Review of State Court Convictions: Incoherent Law But 
an Essential Right, 64 ME. L. REV. 379, 381 (2011); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus 
and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 64–66 (2012) (noting that the Judiciary Act of 1789 
“empowered all federal judges to grant the writ” and “provided for factual and legal review of 
detention of federal prisoners”). 
 18. Blume et al., supra note 6, at 440 & n.23. 
 19. See id. at 440 & nn.24–28 (providing an overview of the Supreme Court decisions of 
these two decades that “ushered in the modern era of federal habeas corpus,” and “set the high-
water mark for habeas review of state court judgments”); Blume, supra note 12, at 262–63 & 
nn.18–19 (noting the cases that prompted debate of habeas petitions). 
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With the writ’s latest expansion, however, came a flood of 
petitions.20 This flood promoted a perception that the writ was being 
“abused,” as litigants sometimes waited years before filing a petition 
or filed successive petitions attacking the same conviction.21 Soon 
thereafter, the Court began rolling back these expansions, creating 
procedural barriers to the writ itself and limiting the substantive 
constitutional rights that formed the bases for claims.22 In 1995, 
however, Congress still perceived abuse of the writ to be a significant 
problem.23 Consequently, it enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 199624 (AEDPA).25 
AEDPA did far more than the Court had already done to restrict 
federal habeas review, including imposing a one-year statute of 
limitations26 and requiring federal courts to be deferential to the 
findings and conclusions of state courts.27 Although both are 
considered “major provisions” of AEDPA,28 the latter has drawn the 
most attention. By requiring such deference AEDPA changed the 
 
 20. See Jane A. Gordon, Comment, Pleading Rule 9 of the Rules Governing Habeas 
Corpus: Sua Sponte Departure from Precedent and Congressional Intent, 38 EMORY L.J. 489, 489 
(1989) (“In the single decade between 1954 and 1963, the number of habeas corpus petitions 
filed annually in federal court increased 352%, and by 1963 habeas corpus petitions comprised 
3.3% of the total federal caseload.”). By 1976, it comprised 6 percent of the total federal 
caseload. Id. 
 21. See id. at 489–90 (discussing Congress’s passage of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus 
in 1976 and the purpose behind the enactment of rules 9(a), which addressed delayed petitions, 
and 9(b), which addressed successive petitions, mainly, to curb these “abuse[s] of the writ”). 
 22. See Blume et al., supra note 6, at 440–41 (discussing, in brief, the limitations imposed 
on federal habeas review of state-court convictions by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts); 
Blume, supra note 12, at 265–70 (providing a more detailed accounting of the cases that 
reshaped federal habeas review).  
 23. Federal Habeas Corpus Reform: Eliminating Prisoners’ Abuse of the Judicial Process: 
Hearing on S. 623 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2 (1995) (statement of Sen. 
Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“This abuse of habeas corpus litigation, 
particularly in those cases involving lawfully imposed death sentences, has seriously eroded the 
public’s confidence in our criminal justice system, drained State criminal justice resources, and 
taken a dreadful toll on victims’ families.”). 
 24. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2266 (2012)). 
 25. See Blume, supra note 12, at 259–60 (describing what the enactment of AEDPA meant 
to its supporters). 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012). 
 27. See id. § 2254(d) (restricting the grant of habeas corpus only to state-court proceedings 
that were contrary to or an unreasonable application of “clearly established federal law” or 
were “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts”). 
 28. Adelman, supra note 17, at 384. 
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nature of the relationship between federal and state courts,29 
undermining the very purpose of federal habeas review of state-court 
convictions.30 Moreover, the Court’s interpretations of AEDPA’s 
provisions have been largely restrictive, further narrowing federal 
habeas review.31 
2. Resulting Complexity.  An area of law can be complex because 
the legal doctrines or statutes are intricate or simply numerous,32 or 
because of the “technical nature of the facts.”33 The complexity in 
modern federal habeas review is of the former nature. It derives from 
many judge-made legal doctrines of federal and state origin that 
interact with an intricate federal statutory scheme. The result, 
according to some, is an “incoherent” body of law34 that produces 
“mind-numbingly complicated and confusing litigation.”35 
 
 29. E.g., Blume, supra note 12, at 260, 272 (referring to § 2254(d) as the “centerpiece” of 
AEDPA and describing how it prevents federal courts from “overturning . . . the state court 
apple cart”). 
 30. See Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 888, 946 (1998) (agreeing with then-Senator Biden’s comments on § 2254(d) 
during a Senate debate that the provision was “directly contrary to the purpose of habeas 
corpus” in that it prevented federal courts from “grant[ing] a claim that was adjudicated in State 
court proceedings”). Justin Marceau argues that the more important purpose of federal habeas 
review of state-court convictions is “ensuring that the state court process is fundamentally fair,” 
not that it results in the overturning of wrongful convictions. See Marceau, supra note 5, at 86. 
This purpose is also undermined by § 2254(d), however, as deference does not equate with a 
critical review of the state-court process.  
 31. See Marceau, supra note 5, at 106–24 (detailing two 2011 Supreme Court cases that 
narrowly interpret § 2254(d) to restrict access to habeas corpus); see also White v. Woodall, 134 
S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014) (reasoning that “[s]ection 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in 
which a state court unreasonably applies this Court’s precedent; it does not require state courts 
to extend that precedent” even to contexts where the precedent should have controlled). But see 
generally Justin F. Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive? Federal Habeas After Martinez, 55 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2071 (2014) (arguing that three recent cases point to a shift in the Supreme 
Court’s focus from guilt/innocence to ensuring fair procedures which has the potential to 
increase the chances of a successful habeas corpus claim). For an argument that the Court’s 
restrictive interpretations of AEDPA result from its own institutional interests, see Aziz Z. 
Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 52–63 
(2015).  
 32. See Revesz, supra note 16, at 1117 & n.31 (“The classic example of a legally complex 
field is tax law.”).  
 33. Id. at 1117–18 (offering patent law as an example). 
 34. Adelman, supra note 17, at 384. 
 35. Jordan Steiker, Opinion Analysis: Innocence Exception Survives, Innocence Claim Does 
Not (Updated), SCOTUSBLOG (May 29, 2013, 11:06 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/05/
opinion-analysis-innocence-exception-survives-innocence-claim-does-not [http://perma.cc/J84H-
V85V].  
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Federal habeas law has also been described as maze-like because 
of its many procedural checkpoints;36 that overcoming these hurdles 
requires familiarity with state and federal legal doctrines as well as 
state and federal statutes only adds to the complexity.37 To describe 
this complexity in another way, a single case may raise questions of 
both federal and state law, require an understanding of the legal 
doctrines at issue, and demand knowledge of which legal doctrines 
are superseded by statute and which doctrines serve as exceptions to 
the same statute—all before reaching the merits of the substantive 
claims. 
Because federal courts operate with limited judicial resources, 
judicial efficiency is critical to ensuring that courts can meet the 
obligations of a burgeoning caseload.38 Of course, efficiency must not 
come at the expense of accuracy. Yet a trade-off between these goals 
is unavoidable when a particular area of law features heightened 
complexity: either too little time is being spent to fully develop or 
understand the issues, or too much time is being spent at the expense 
of other cases.39 Expertise can help resolve, or at least ease, this 
tension because it ensures efficiency without diminishing accuracy.40 
 
 36. Even prior to AEDPA’s passing, “[s]imply navigating through the procedural maze of 
habeas practice . . . [was] a formidable task.” John H. Blume & David P. Voisin, An 
Introduction to Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, 47 S.C. L. REV. 271, 272 (1996). 
 37. See id. at 273 n.2 (describing the need to exhaust all claims in state court before 
proceeding to federal court).  
 38. See James F. Holderman & Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation Predicament in the 
United States, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 4 (noting that volume and diversity “demand 
constant attention to efficiency, without which the caseload would burgeon beyond the 
capability of any one judge to provide justice as is necessary in each case”). 
 39. Federal District Court Judge James Holderman wrote:  
I do not have the luxury of spending the time to learn more about a specific area of 
the law than necessary to resolve a particular case or a particular issue that may need 
resolution. . . . Because of the constant press of the rest of our caseload, we often find 
it difficult to devote the time that, in a perfect world, would be devoted to any case, 
let alone a complex patent case.  
Id. at 4–5. 
 40. See Lawrence Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization, 58 DUKE L.J. 1667, 
1676 (2009) (“[M]ore expert judges, who know more about the field in which they are deciding 
cases, are more likely to get decisions right.”); Holderman & Guren, supra note 38, at 5–6 
(noting that the Federal Circuit’s high rate of reversal of district court decisions is partially due 
to the fact that district court judges are generalists by “trade and training”); see also Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Hearings on H.R. 2405 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 42–43 (1981) 
(statement of the Hon. Howard T. Markey, C.J., Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) (“[I]f I 
am doing brain surgery every day, day in and day out, chances are very good that I will do your 
brain surgery much quicker . . . than someone who does brain surgery once every couple of 
years.”). 
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Consequently, expertise is most suitable, even necessary, when a 
disproportionate amount of judicial resources are required to decide 
a particular class of cases because of their heightened complexity. 
B. Uniformity and Coherence 
Uniformity is critical to ensuring predictability of law, and forum 
shopping is the symptom that can diagnose its absence or shortage. 
For example, one of the driving forces behind the creation of the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was the need for uniformity 
among circuit courts’ decisions involving patent law.41 Specifically, the 
differing rates at which circuit courts found patents to be valid and 
infringed led to “rampant” forum shopping.42 This in turn made it 
difficult for lawyers to “counsel technology developers or users” and 
created a legal environment that disincentivized investment in 
research and development.43 
Although forum shopping is not a concern with habeas 
petitions,44 perceptions exist that certain circuits are friendlier than 
others to habeas claims brought by state prisoners. For example, the 
Ninth Circuit, deemed the most “liberal circuit in the land,” often 
receives greater scrutiny by the Supreme Court with respect to habeas 
claims.45 The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, has been criticized 
for its “conservative” approach to habeas claims with some suggesting 
that it “artificially depresses the overall success rate” of habeas 
claims.46 These perceptions are supported by one analysis which 
followed noncapital § 2254 cases from July 1, 2005 to September 30, 
2009 as they proceeded from federal district courts through appellate 
 
 41. Revesz, supra note 16, at 1116–17. 
 42. Rochelle Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1, 7 (1989). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Section 2254 petitioners may file in the district in which they were convicted or in which 
they are imprisoned. Whatever the choice, for the majority of prisoners, both districts will be in 
the same state and thus under a single circuit court’s jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (2012).  
 45. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Reversals Deliver a Dressing-Down to the Liberal 9th 
Circuit, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2011, at A13 (noting that an “opinion granting habeas” by Judge 
Reinhardt, “widely considered to be the nation’s most liberal appeals court judge,” “gets extra 
scrutiny”). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Myth of the Liberal Ninth Circuit, 37 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1, 4–9 (2009) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit is not that liberal considering its restrictive 
holding in Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002), a habeas case involving 
Guantanamo Bay detainees that had arguably stronger statutory and case law support for a 
favorable holding for the detainees). 
 46. Blume et al., supra note 6, at 452 n.92. 
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courts.47 It found that there was “substantial variation” in the success 
rates48 of habeas petitions among the circuits, from 1.66 percent in the 
Eleventh Circuit to 22.85 percent in the Sixth Circuit.49 
Although the federal appellate courts may be as valuable 
laboratories for experimentation as state courts and legislatures are,50 
the vast difference between the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits’ success 
rates is problematic. This gap cannot be explained by a few different 
legal rules, but rather must result from a difference in approach 
entirely. This reveals the source of the disuniformity: a lack of 
coherence in federal habeas review. Coherence requires a single 
vision of an area of law.51 A single vision or purpose guides federal 
courts in the development of the law and minimizes the likelihood of 
contradictory legal interpretations and inconsistent legal rules.52 One 
cause of the disuniformity in the patent system, for example, was a 
lack of agreement on whether the courts should “impose[] difficult 
burdens on patentees, or light ones on infringers.”53 The Federal 
Circuit resolved this split by “articulat[ing] rules that are consistent 
with the underlying philosophy of patent law.”54 
Similarly, the values that underlie federal habeas review are 
often at cross purposes from one another because the modern system 
in fact reflects two competing visions. The first is the Warren Court’s 
ideal in which the ultimate goal is fairness; the other is Congress’s 
version in which the ultimate goal is finality. Thus, though the 
modern system tries to ensure that state-court proceedings are fair 
and protect the federal rights of individuals, it counterintuitively 
limits the opportunities available to seek collateral review and 
correspondingly limits the opportunities available to examine state-
 
 47. Id. at 452 & nn.91–92. 
 48. Id. at 452 n.92. The authors coded success as instances in which the court of appeals 
affirmed a district court decision to grant relief on the merits without remanding for additional 
proceedings or reversed a district court decision to deny the same. Id. at 452 n.91. 
 49. Id. at 452 n.92.  
 50. See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 441 n.215 (2007) 
(“Scholars have debated whether or not it is beneficial to allow legal issues to ‘percolate’ in the 
lower courts, thereby producing a divergence of approaches which may then inform the 
Supreme Court’s ultimate resolution of an issue.”). 
 51. Revesz, supra note 16, at 1117. 
 52. See id. (“Coherence . . . demands not only that the legal rules of a statutory scheme be 
consistent but also that they reflect a unitary vision of that scheme.”). 
 53. Dreyfuss, supra note 42, at 7. 
 54. Id. at 8. 
JINDAL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2016  7:29 AM 
2016] PROCESS MATTERS 1065 
court proceedings for unfairness.55 Whether an individual places 
greater value on fairness or finality has been aligned with the liberal–
conservative spectrum; this measurable party-line delineation 
underscores the depth of the divide between these competing visions: 
  Conservatives view habeas corpus as the vehicle that guilty 
people use to escape convictions and sentences. They emphasize the 
importance of finality and urge limiting the availability of habeas 
corpus to those who can make a colorable showing of their 
innocence. Liberals see habeas corpus as an essential protection 
against individuals being held in violation of the Constitution and 
laws of the United States. They argue that habeas corpus does not 
exist solely to free innocents who were wrongfully convicted; it 
serves to assure that no person is imprisoned because of an 
infringement of his or her constitutional rights.56 
When a particular circuit court’s jurists emphasize one value over 
the other, interpretations of the same doctrines or statutory 
provisions will differ across circuits and create disuniformity. Petition 
outcomes will, accordingly, diverge along the same lines as the 
different interpretations.57 For example, one of the most litigated 
provisions of AEDPA is § 2254(d)(1) which precludes habeas relief 
absent a showing that the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court.”58 Under Williams v. 
Taylor,59 “unreasonable application” requires an “objectively 
unreasonable” standard of review.60 One analysis of twenty-two 
Supreme Court decisions between 2000 and 2010 applying the 
“unreasonable application” test in capital cases noted that the “liberal 
bloc” of justices, composed of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Stevens, 
“found the [state courts’] decisions to be an ‘unreasonable 
 
 55. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 56. Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking about Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 750 
(1987) (footnotes omitted).  
 57. See, e.g., Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180, 189–90 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc) 
(Gregory, J., dissenting) (describing how concerns about fairness led him to decide in favor of 
the petitioner whereas concerns about finality led the majority to decide in favor of the 
government).  
 58. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012); see also Daniel J. McGrady, Comment, Whose Line Is It 
Anyway?: A Retrospective Study of the Supreme Court’s Split Analysis of § 2254(d)(1) Since 
2000, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1599, 1612 n.84 (2011) (reviewing twenty-two Supreme Court 
decisions since 2000 that have applied the “unreasonable application” test in a capital context).  
 59. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 60. Id. at 409. 
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application’ of the law 53–64% of the time.”61 In contrast, the 
“conservative bloc,” composed of Justices Scalia, Thomas, Rehnquist, 
Roberts, and Alito, found an unreasonable application of the law in 
only 4–14 percent of cases.62 This large disparity suggests these blocs 
of the Court have different interpretations of “objectively 
unreasonable” that hew to the liberal–conservative divide identified 
above: the liberal or fairness-minded Justices are imposing a more 
exacting review on the state courts, whereas the conservative or 
finality-minded Justices are imposing a less stringent review.63 Thus 
the standard of review imposed has less to do with the law than with 
the vision held by the justices of the purpose and role of habeas 
corpus in the criminal justice system. The lack of coherence therefore 
largely leaves the outcome of a particular habeas petition to the luck 
of the draw that the majority of the panel assigned to review it are 
fairness-minded as opposed to finality-minded.  
C. Accuracy 
A special concern for accuracy exists in federal habeas review 
because the consequences from errors in individual cases are more 
broadly harmful than in other areas of law, primarily because these 
errors disrupt the conception of courts as guarantors of justice. 
The need for accuracy, that the appeals court reaches the right 
decision, is two-fold, as it is critical to both its functions: the 
development of law and the correction of errors in individual cases.64 
Errors made by circuit courts while performing the first function are 
typically only realized years later, when a defect in a legal rule 
eventually emerges or the legal rule is modified or overturned by the 
Supreme Court. 
Errors in individual cases are defined by the Supreme Court as 
“erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated 
rule.”65 Whereas the costs associated with the first kind of error 
 
 61. Id. at 1602, 1615–16. This percentage was calculated for each Justice and the range 
reflects the different rates at which each Justice found an unreasonable application. Id. at 1616 
& n.115.  
 62. Id. at 1602, 1615–16. 
 63. See id. at 1602–03, 1615–16 (suggesting that the liberal bloc applies something closer to 
a “de novo” standard of review while the conservative bloc applies something closer to “blind 
deference”).  
 64. Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of 
Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 649 (1988). 
 65. SUP. CT. R. 10. 
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impact the public, government, and industries in addition to 
individual litigants,66 the costs associated with the second kind are 
typically limited to the parties involved. In the habeas context, 
however, these errors are more broadly harmful, imposing significant 
costs on the prisoner, the legal system, and the public. 
At stake in any habeas petition is not property but liberty. The 
strongest action the State can take against an individual is to imprison 
him. The procedural safeguards in the American criminal justice 
system, from the right to an attorney to holding the prosecution to the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof, stand as a testament to 
this great power of the State and the need to exercise it judiciously 
and accurately. Errors in this context are thus of the kind gravest. 
There is a reason the writ of habeas corpus is also known as the 
“Great Writ of Liberty”: it is a fundamental safeguard of personal 
freedom,67 one that the Framers valued enough to write into the 
Constitution.68 Incorrectly denying this relief frustrates the very 
purpose of the writ as the wrongful restriction on liberty continues. 
This is injustice redoubled; the American legal system has failed this 
person, not once, but twice. Moreover, because the Supreme Court 
rarely grants certiorari to correct such errors,69 the appellate court’s 
incorrect decision is typically permanent.70 As a consequence, the 
wrongfully convicted stand to lose decades of their lives. 
Additionally, because innocence cases tend to draw public 
attention, courts can come under great scrutiny when they decide 
them.71 As representatives of the criminal justice system, judges are in 
 
 66. See Kurt T. Lash, The Cost of Judicial Error: Stare Decisis and the Role of Normative 
Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189, 2189 (2014) (describing the costs associated with 
changes in constitutional law). 
 67. See Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961) (describing the writ as “the highest 
safeguard of liberty”). 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”); 
Chemerinsky, supra note 56, at 748. 
 69. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the 
asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated 
rule of law.”).  
 70. Barring, of course, a grant to file a second or successive petition under sections 
2244(b)(2)(A) or 2244(b)(2)(B).  
 71. See, e.g., Lisa Marcus, Anatomy of a Wrongful Conviction Case, CRIME REPORT (June 
30, 2011, 12:38 AM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/archive/2011-06-anatomy-of-a-wrongful-
conviction-case [http://perma.cc/E6HC-ULQG] (describing the defense attorney’s belief that 
“widespread press coverage of the case” was partially responsible for the judge’s decision to 
hold a hearing).  
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a position to restore faith that justice will ultimately prevail.72 
Erroneously failing to grant relief, however, erodes the public’s 
confidence in the criminal justice system just as much as convicting 
the innocent or convicting without the guarantees of due process 
does.73 If the public is convinced that an innocent man is in prison, it 
expects a stampede to justice; the years-long, decades-long delays do 
not jive with American society’s understanding of the purposes and 
workings of the criminal justice system.74 The errors and subsequent 
delays to correct those errors challenge the belief that bureaucracy 
belongs to only the other two branches of government. 
Finally, none of the four primary values underlying the criminal 
justice system—retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
incapacitation75—are served when the innocent are wrongfully 
convicted and these errors go uncorrected. The wrongfully convicted 
individual has done nothing to warrant retribution, nor will he be 
deterred, rehabilitated, or incapacitated from future wrongdoing any 
more than he was before his conviction. Moreover, when courts 
erroneously deny relief to an innocent, they perpetuate the myth that 
the guilty person is behind bars. In reality, that person “go[es] 
 
 72. See Hans Sherrer, The Complicity of Judges in Wrongful Convictions, PRISON LEGAL 
NEWS, Aug. 2004, at 1, 1 (noting that “judges are often thought of by lay people and portrayed 
by the news and other broadcast media, as impartial, apolitical men and women who possess 
great intelligence, wisdom, and compassion, and are concerned with ensuring that justice 
prevails in every case”).  
 73. Justice for All: Convicting the Guilty and Exonerating the Innocent: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Justice for All Hearing] (statement 
of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); see also Michael Hewlett & Arika 
Herron, Federal Court Rejects Kalvin Michael Smith’s Appeal, WINSTON-SALEM J. (July 29, 
2013, 2:09 PM), http://www.journalnow.com/news/local/federal-court-rejects-kalvin-michael-
smith-s-appeal/article_065242e0-f87a-11e2-b981-0019bb30f31a.html [http://perma.cc/K42R-
RZLT] (“The Rev. Carlton Eversley of Dellabrook Presbyterian Church called Eagle’s ruling a 
‘tragic injustice, another case of an innocent person being railroaded.’”).  
 74. See Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT (June 4, 2015, 10:40 
AM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/compensating
-the-wrongly-convicted [http://perma.cc/HAF4-W73Y] (noting that even the wrongfully 
convicted who have DNA evidence available to exonerate them spend “on average, more than 
14 years behind bars”); see also Carol J. Williams, Relief Delayed for Prisoners Wrongfully 
Convicted, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/aug/21/local/la-me-
judge-delays-20110822 [http://perma.cc/7KUS-4KUF] (reporting on a judge’s years-long delay 
to rule on meritorious habeas petitions and the tragic death of one of the prisoners waiting for 
relief). 
 75. JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW 21 (7th ed. 
2012).  
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unpunished, free to murder or rape or rob again.”76 So not only are 
these values not being served with respect to the wrongfully 
convicted, they are also not being served with respect to the actually 
guilty. 
In conclusion, the heightened complexity of federal habeas law 
requires expertise to resolve the tension between accuracy and 
efficiency; the competing visions of the writ lead to inconsistent legal 
principles and disuniformity, where certain judges and courts are 
more likely to grant relief than others; and the broadly harmful costs 
associated with wrongful convictions and failing to correct them in 
collateral proceedings require a special attention to accuracy. These 
factors justify specialized review of habeas petitions by a national 
court of appeals. 
II.  A SPECIALIZED COURT 
This Part proceeds by first offering some specifics on the form a 
specialized court for habeas corpus should take. It then discusses the 
benefits and drawbacks of a specialized court and concludes that, due 
to the political realities, it is ultimately unlikely that such a court 
would ever be created. Part III consequently offers an alternative 
mechanism for injecting specialization into federal habeas review. 
A. What Should This Specialized Court Look Like? 
The specialized court should be a single, national Article III 
court of appeals that has complete jurisdiction over all federal habeas 
appeals, including capital and noncapital § 2254 and § 2255 petitions, 
to the exclusion of other intermediate courts of appeals. It should also 
be the only court that is capable of granting certificates of 
appealability to second or successive petitions. 
This court should have jurisdiction beyond just noncapital § 2254 
petitions for two reasons. First, the governing law is largely the same. 
Federal prisoners seeking habeas relief file a motion under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 while state prisoners seeking habeas relief in federal courts file 
a motion under § 2254.77 In Davis v. United States,78 the Supreme 
 
 76. See Marcus, supra note 71 (pointing out that wrongful conviction investigations are “an 
attempt to serve law and order” upon those who have escaped punishment, rather than “an 
assault by soft-on-crime bleeding hearts”). 
 77. Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral 
Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 95 (2012). 
 78. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974). 
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Court stated that “§ 2255 was intended to mirror § 2254 in operative 
effect.”79 As a result, most courts read the provisions together80 and 
precedents under either “may generally be used interchangeably.”81 
Though capital cases do raise some additional issues, these are largely 
procedural and typically arise at the very beginning and at the very 
end of the case.82 Consequently, they stand to benefit just as much 
from a specialized forum as noncapital cases do.  
Second, in the twelve-month period ending on March 31, 2014, 
5406 noncapital § 2254 habeas appeals arising from the federal district 
courts were commenced in the federal courts of appeals, accounting 
for 13.03 percent of all appeals.83 Including capital § 2254 cases and 
capital and noncapital § 2255 cases, this percentage increases to 15.82 
percent.84 This relatively minimal increase of 2.79 percent in the 
specialized court’s caseload suggests that the benefits of including 
these cases within its jurisdiction85 outweigh any potential costs.86 
Additionally, only the specialized court should have authority to 
grant a certificate of appealability (COA) to second or successive 
petitions. This approach would reduce the likelihood of two 
problematic scenarios. The first is one in which a circuit court grants a 
COA to a petitioner for a reason that the specialized court later finds 
to be incorrect or insufficient under the law. In the second, a circuit 
court denies a COA when one should have been granted. In the 
former case, there is an unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources 
by both the circuit court that granted the COA and the district court 
that then heard and ruled on the second or successive petition. In the 
second case, the specialized court would be unable to hear the second 
 
 79. Id. at 344. 
 80. Russell, supra note 77, at 96. 
 81. 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & CATHERINE 
T. STRUVE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 623 (4th ed. 1998). 
 82. See generally KRISTINE M. FOX, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CAPITAL § 2254 HABEAS CASES: 
A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2012), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cap2254
hab.pdf/$file/cap2254hab.pdf [http://perma.cc/8AVM-X6UK] (providing an overview of the 
issues judges can expect to see in capital § 2254 cases). 
 83. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 
2014—TABLE B-7 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/9789/download [http://perma.cc/P3VV-
QQ9J] (reporting 5406 noncapital § 2254 cases). This number does not include second or 
successive petitions which are tracked as part of a separate miscellaneous category by the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.  
 84. Id. The individual numbers for these appeals are as follows: 982 noncapital § 2255; 7 
capital § 2255; 172 capital § 2254. Id.  
 85. See infra Part II.B. 
 86. See infra Part II.C. 
JINDAL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2016  7:29 AM 
2016] PROCESS MATTERS 1071 
or successive petition because under § 2244(b)(3) the decision to 
grant or deny a COA to a second or successive petition by a circuit 
court cannot be appealed. Therefore, only the specialized court 
should have jurisdiction to decide whether a litigant can file a 
successive or second habeas petition. 
B. The Benefits of a Specialized Court 
The factors most strongly justifying specialized review 
correspond to its greatest benefits. Complexity requires expertise; 
that expertise yields accuracy as well as efficiency.87 Increased 
accuracy means a lower likelihood of errors denying meritorious 
petitioners relief and the costs associated with such errors.88 
Establishing a specialized court to correct errors in the criminal 
justice system would also help restore some of the public’s lost 
confidence by serving as a signal to the public that the criminal justice 
system, including federal courts, takes wrongful convictions seriously 
and wants to see these injustices corrected.89 
This court would also reduce the caseloads of the other courts of 
appeals. Although the impact on each circuit will vary depending on 
what proportion of its docket consists of habeas appeals, the net 
benefit will be that judges—on both the specialized court and the 
other courts of appeals—will have more time to consider the cases on 
their dockets and produce higher quality opinions.90 
Lastly, judges have expressed frustration with the frivolity of the 
majority of habeas petitions.91 Although a single specialized court 
would not yield a higher concentration of successful petitions (ones in 
which the court of appeals granted or affirmed relief on the merits 
outright), it would present an increased number of successful 
petitions before a single panel, which could reduce some of this 
frustration.92 A hypothetical helps illuminate the point: Assume there 
 
 87. See supra Part I.A. 
 88. See supra Part I.C.  
 89. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
 90. See supra note 40. 
 91. See, e.g., FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE 52 (1990) (noting the “oft raised contention that the federal courts are subjected to 
unnecessary and overwhelming numbers of successive habeas corpus petitions and evidentiary 
hearings in non-death penalty cases brought by state prisoners”); infra text accompanying note 
155.  
 92. Cf. Blume et al., supra note 6, at 452 & nn.91–92 (examining the number of noncapital 
§ 2254 cases in which the federal appellate courts granted or affirmed relief on the merits 
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are one thousand § 2254 petitions in a given year in the country 
spread evenly across the circuits. If only ten of them are successful, 
each circuit may see only one of these ten in that year. Moreover, a 
particular judge could go many years without presiding over a single 
successful petition. But if one specialized court reviewed all one 
thousand § 2254 cases, it would also see all ten successful petitions. 
And although the concentration of successful petitions overall (1 
percent) would not change, the judges on the specialized court would 
be more likely to preside over at least one, and possibly more, 
successful petitions in a given year. Even if a judge on the specialized 
court did not preside over a successful case herself, she would be in 
greater proximity to all ten successful decisions that a judge on a 
regional circuit court. Closer proximity to successful petitions will 
reduce the frustrations engendered by frivolous appeals because the 
successful petitions will serve as a reminder of the great stakes and 
importance of the work—of courts, of justice—to the petitioner, his 
family, his community, and the public at large.93 
C. The Drawbacks of a Specialized Court 
Although federal habeas law needs coherence, it is unlikely that 
a specialized court would make much headway in achieving this goal. 
In the first instance, just as with the current generalized circuit courts, 
the makeup of the judicial panels that preside over a particular case in 
the specialized court will have some impact on the outcome.94 
A second drawback is that a single court may make it difficult 
and expensive for attorneys representing petitioners to investigate 
and litigate these claims. Attorneys who represent prisoners are 
typically local and either work on a pro bono basis or are court-
appointed.95 The circuit courts currently have various methods for 
appointing qualified attorneys who are familiar with federal habeas 
 
between July 1, 2005 to September 30, 2009 and the “substantial variation” in success rates 
among the circuits, from 1.66 percent in the Eleventh Circuit to 22.85 percent in the Sixth 
Circuit); infra Part III.C.4.  
 93. See John Rudolf, LaMonte Armstrong’s Long Road to Freedom After Wrongful 
Conviction, HUFFINGTON POST (July 2, 2012, 6:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
07/02/lamonte-armstrong-wrongfully-convicted_n_1644714.html [http://perma.cc/7V2Y-68Z7] 
(reporting the comment of the presiding judge that “freeing Armstrong was likely the ‘closest to 
knowing I’m doing justice, in my career, I will ever experience’”). 
 94. See supra Part I.B. 
 95. See FOX, supra note 82, at 3–5 (discussing the process for appointing an attorney to a 
pro se litigant and the various private and public groups that provide representation on a 
volunteer basis).  
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review, including having a selection committee, working with the 
local federal defender’s office, or maintaining a list of qualified 
attorneys. A specialized court, located in one part of the country, will 
have limited information about the qualifications of attorneys outside 
its geographic location and, consequently, will have trouble 
developing a roster of attorneys around the country on whom it can 
call to provide prisoners with representation.96 Alternatively, if the 
specialized court sources its attorneys from local groups well known 
to it, these groups will face considerable expense when they represent 
clients located in other states. These attorneys will have limited 
ability to investigate the claims because it would require long trips to 
find and interview witnesses, explore new investigative avenues, and 
collect evidence. This level of expense is unlikely to be sustainable for 
the majority of groups privately and publicly funded and could result 
in these groups taking on fewer clients. This scenario could even 
result in a backlog as the court waits for willing and qualified 
attorneys to become available. 
Political imbalance provides a third objection—a single court 
could come to be dominated by judges who think alike on a particular 
area of law and who would transform the court into a tool for 
enacting radical change in the field.97 Because of the likelihood that 
the judge who values fairness will grant relief in the same case in 
which a judge who values finality will deny relief,98 appointing judges 
to the specialized court is likely to be difficult. Political actors who 
believe that the law should value finality will want to appoint like-
minded judges; the same is true for those who value fairness. A long, 
drawn-out fight over nominations not only means that the court itself 
could become politicized, it also suggests that the long-term goal of 
bringing coherence to federal habeas law will be difficult, perhaps 
even impossible, to achieve.99  
 
 96. See id. (noting the difficulty of finding qualified attorneys and describing the use of 
local groups to source the roster list).  
 97. See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 91, at 11 (noting, with regard to 
specialized courts in general, “the danger of political imbalance (e.g., a criminal court 
dominated by one end or the other of the spectrum that runs from the extreme ‘law and order’ 
position to extreme solicitude for the rights of criminal defendants)”). 
 98. See supra Part I.B.  
 99. See RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION 
PROCESS 4–6 (2005) (arguing that “Supreme Court nominations have become public pitched 
battles involving partisans, ideological groups, single-issue groups, and the press” and now 
increasingly resemble presidential elections); id. at 4, 34–35 (noting the use of “litmus tests” by 
presidents and interests groups in identifying acceptable nominees and the criticism that such 
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A final drawback is the isolation of specialized courts from other 
areas of law. Generalist judges benefit from “the cross-fertilization of 
ideas,” which can occur when they “look[] at cases from one field and 
realize[] how an earlier decision in which [they] participated from a 
different field may suggest a creative answer to the problem.”100 
Accordingly, specialization carries the “danger of tunnel vision.”101 
This danger may be especially great in the habeas context: because 
the writ’s presence in American law dates back to the Founding,102 
many of the common-law doctrines applicable to it are also applicable 
to other areas of law and vice versa.103 
D. Feasibility 
The creation of this specialized court is, unfortunately, unlikely. 
Judges may not be willing to agree that a specialized court is needed 
to hear these cases104 and Congress, in its current and seemingly 
permanent climate of partisan gridlock, is unlikely to come to 
agreement over what kind of review is warranted for habeas corpus 
litigation.105 Even without these obstacles, the substantial potential for 
 
tests result in the corruption of the nominating process); cf. Eric Black Ink, Something Changed: 
Picking a Supreme Court Justice Is Now a Partisan Battle, MINNPOST (Nov. 26, 2012), 
https://www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2012/11/something-changed-picking-supreme-court-
justice-now-partisan-battle [http://perma.cc/9V6H-RJWS] (arguing that the public controversy 
after Roe v. Wade made abortion a focus of Supreme Court nominations but “[l]uckily for Roe 
supporters, the new partisan norms of appointments did not take full effect immediately after 
the ruling, or Roe would likely have been reversed by now”).  
 100. Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1767 
(1997). 
 101. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 91, at 11.  
 102. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 103. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). There the Court held that 
§ 2244(d) “is subject to equitable tolling,” id. at 2560, a conclusion partially based on a previous 
decision that a “nonjurisdictional federal statute of limitations is normally subject to a 
‘rebuttable presumption’ in favor ‘of equitable tolling,’” id. at 2561 (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of 
Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)). The Court went on to say that “[i]n the case of 
AEDPA, the presumption’s strength is reinforced by the fact that ‘equitable principles’ have 
traditionally ‘governed’ the substantive law of habeas corpus, for we will ‘not construe a statute 
to displace courts’ traditional equitable authority absent the ‘clearest command.’” Id. (citations 
omitted).  
 104. For example, Judge Lynn Adelman notes, “But, in truth, while some federal courts are 
overburdened, most are not, and addressing habeas petitions is not particularly onerous.” 
Adelman, supra note 17, at 382.  
 105. Compare Justice for All Hearing, supra note 73, at 1–3 (statement of Sen. Patrick 
Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“In the coming weeks, I expect the Judiciary 
Committee to take up the reauthorization of the Justice for All Act, which will include . . . new 
protections for victims of crime [and] funding for State and local governments for DNA 
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politicization of the court and the consequences of a political 
imbalance are enough to make this an unattractive option for those 
who favor an expanded writ and for those who favor a limited one. 
Although the creation of a national court of appeals that hears 
only habeas petitions is unlikely, the benefits of specialized review 
can still be achieved, and without the above drawbacks, by employing 
expert staff attorneys to screen and evaluate habeas claims. This 
solution would ensure that judges are in the best position possible 
when adjudicating habeas claims. The next Part addresses this form of 
specialized review. 
III.  SPECIALIZED STAFF REVIEW 
For the last forty-odd years, federal appellate courts have 
employed staff attorneys to keep up with growing caseloads and to 
ensure the efficient allocation of scarce judicial resources. This Part 
argues that by modifying current practices regarding staff attorneys, 
courts can generate even more efficiency and accuracy in adjudicating 
habeas corpus claims. After explaining why specialized staff attorneys 
should be used to review habeas petitions, this Part details the 
appeals courts’ current practices, the problems and inefficiencies 
created by these practices, and the modifications needed to refine the 
system to achieve the best results. This inquiry demonstrates that 
specialization of staff attorneys alleviates most of the concerns raised 
by scholars on the circuit courts’ use of staff attorneys. 
A. Staff Attorneys and Habeas Corpus 
Staff attorneys are unlike judicial law clerks in that they serve the 
whole court and not an individual judge.106 Federal appellate courts 
 
testing.”), with id. at 3–4 (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary) (“We do not have the resources at the federal level to provide funding to States 
to review every single criminal case after each case has exhausted all appellate remedies, nor 
should we interfere with the day-to-day intricacies of State criminal justice.”). Even the idea of 
the now-lauded Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was controversial and strongly 
objected to by judges and scholars. See, e.g., Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent 
Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425, 425 (1951) (arguing against 
specialized courts, in particular a specialized court for patent cases).  
 106. Timothy E. Gammon, The Central Staff Attorneys’ Office in the United States Court of 
Appeals, Eighth Circuit: A Five Year Report, 29 S.D. L. REV. 457, 458 (1984). These clerks are 
also different from career chamber clerks, who serve individual judges in their chambers.  
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began hiring staff attorneys in the early 1970s.107 Since then, their 
purpose has not changed: staff attorneys help judges manage their 
caseloads by screening cases for nonargument review108 and preparing 
memorandums and draft dispositions for cases on the nonargument 
track. Because judges typically devote less time to cases on the 
nonargument track,109 not all cases are suitable for nonargument 
review. As Marin Levy identified, there are two categories of cases 
best suited for nonargument review: The first includes cases that 
“raise issues that the court sees frequently,” as the court’s familiarity 
reduces the need for oral argument.110 The second category is 
composed of cases “that are least likely to have errors upon arrival at 
the appellate courts,” either because they are “patently frivolous” or 
because they have already “undergone . . . a meaningful layer of 
review.”111 When reviewed by non-expert staff attorneys, habeas cases 
do not fully belong to either of these categories. 
1. Frequently Arising Issues.  Review of habeas petitions typically 
follows a pattern of inquiry. Before reaching the merits of a case, the 
federal court must be sure that the petition has been properly 
presented.112 This entails deciding the following procedural questions 
for § 2254 petitions: (1) whether the petitioner is still in state custody; 
(2) whether the petition is timely; (3) whether the petition is 
successive; and (4) whether the petitioner exhausted all available 
state remedies for all claims raised.113 If the court reaches the merits of 
the case, it must determine whether the state court decided the claim 
 
 107. Id.; see Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d 1091, 1095 (4th Cir. 1972) 
(“Two very able young lawyers with prior concentrated academic or practical experience in this 
field serve as our habeas clerks and as advocates for the appellants.”).  
 108. Briefly, cases sorted for nonargument review are decided without oral arguments, 
typically on the basis of briefs alone, though they may receive some additional treatment 
depending on the circuit. See generally LAURAL HOOPER, DEAN MILETICH & ANGELIA LEVY, 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF 
APPEALS (2011); RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 7. 
 109. See Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 7, at 416 (“[C]ases that receive less judicial 
attention at the outset tend to receive less judicial attention throughout the entire 
decisionmaking process.”).  
 110. Id. at 431–33.  
 111. Id.  
 112. At the screening stage, this would include an assessment of jurisdictional defects. 
HOOPER ET AL., supra note 108, at 18. 
 113. FOX, supra note 82, at 6–10. Though Fox’s guide is tailored to the adjudication of 
capital habeas cases, “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 apply equally to capital and non-capital 
habeas cases.” Id. at 1. The same is true of § 2244(b) (successive petitions) and § 2244(d) 
(timeliness). See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.  
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on the merits. If so, to find that the petitioner should be granted relief 
the court must decide either that (a) the petitioner overcame 
§ 2254(d)(1) by demonstrating that the state court’s decision was 
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” or 
(b) the petitioner overcame § 2254(d)(2) by demonstrating that the 
state court’s decision was “based on an unreasonable determination 
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding.”114 If the state court did not decide the claim on the 
merits, then § 2254(d)(1)–(2) are inapplicable and the federal court 
conducts de novo review. 
At first glance, that the same questions must be answered in a 
particular order for each petition suggests that habeas petitions may 
indeed belong to this first category of cases, in which the same issues 
arise again and again. Answering any one of these questions in 
practice, however, is a laborious process. Each one raises sub-issues 
and requires knowledge and application of different sources of law 
and a thorough review of the factual record to resolve them fully.115 
Moreover, pro se petitions, which comprise more than 90 percent of 
all noncapital habeas petitions,116 present additional challenges. Most 
are handwritten, prepared without legal assistance, and only partially 
complete, requiring staff attorneys to first determine whether such 
petitions actually even constitute an appeal.117 The heightened factual 
and legal complexity coupled with the challenges related to pro se 
appeals means that habeas petitions require a more individualized 
inquiry and do not neatly fit into this category. 
2. Low Likelihood of Having Errors Upon Arrival at the 
Appellate Courts.  Habeas appeals also have characteristics that place 
them within the second category of cases, in which the likelihood of 
error upon arrival at the appellate courts is low. Identifying the 
“patently frivolous”118 appeals, such as those “brought by individuals 
 
 114. FOX, supra note 82, at 12–14. 
 115. See supra Part I.A; see also, e.g., FOX, supra note 82, at 9–10 (noting that determining 
whether a petitioner has exhausted all state remedies requires “an examination of state post-
conviction law”). 
 116. Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Opinion, Justice, Too Much and Too Expensive, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2011, at WK8. 
 117. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LAW CLERK HANDBOOK: A HANDBOOK FOR LAW CLERKS TO 
FEDERAL JUDGES 115–16 (Sylvan A. Sobel ed., 2d ed. 2007).  
 118. Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 7, at 432. 
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who vent their frustrations in the words of a filed complaint”119 and 
those that clearly lack merit,120 is unlikely to be difficult or prone to 
error, especially with the meaningful layer of review provided by the 
district court.121 
Meritorious cases, however, present another story. John Blume, 
Sheri Lynn Johnson, and Keir Weyble reported two significant 
findings from their “ongoing monitoring of court of appeals 
dispositions” in habeas cases: (1) out of 126 cases in which the district 
court granted relief on the merits and which the State appealed, “60 
were affirmed and 66 were reversed” by the courts of appeals, a 
reversal rate of 52.38 percent; (2) “of the 791 district court denials of 
relief, 697 were affirmed and 94 were reversed,” a reversal rate of 
13.49 percent.122 The high reversal rates suggest that, despite the 
meaningful layer of review provided by the district courts, some 
habeas petitions still contain errors upon arrival at the appellate 
courts. Nonargument review may be inappropriate then because non-
expert staff attorneys may not be able to identify quickly and 
accurately the material errors, incorrect applications of law, or novel 
issues requiring judicial attention.123 Additionally, any memos or draft 
dispositions provided to judges for the purposes of deciding these 
cases would be inadequate at best and incorrect at worst. 
3. Does Review by Specialized Staff Attorneys Change This 
Analysis?  If specialized staff attorneys with expert knowledge in 
federal habeas law are charged with review of habeas petitions, the 
nonargument track becomes more suitable. 
Expert knowledge of federal habeas increases both accuracy and 
efficiency. One can gain expert status by earning technical degrees or 
 
 119. Holderman & Guren, supra note 38, at 4; see, e.g., Sumbry v. Davis, 179 F. App’x 519, 
520–21 (10th Cir. 2006) (deciding that an Indiana prisoner’s appeal lacked merit and noting it 
was the “third meritless attempt” to file by a “promiscuous as well as a frivolous filer,” who files 
petitions and appeals all over the country). The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
reported that a single inmate in an Arizona state prison “filed more than 5,400 petitions in both 
the District of Arizona and the Middle District of Tennessee” in the year ending March 31, 
2014. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014, supra note 16. 
 120. Sumbry, 179 F. App’x at 521.  
 121. See Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 7, at 432 (noting that “patently frivolous” 
appeals “present issues that are, on their face, so absurd that it is extremely unlikely that a 
district court would err in resolving them in the first instance, particularly compared to the 
chance of error that exists in nonfrivolous cases”).  
 122. Blume et al., supra note 6, at 452 & n.91. This is a narrow subset of all the cases 
reviewed by the authors.  
 123. For a review of the efficiency and accuracy benefits of expertise, see supra Part I.A.2. 
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credentials or by possessing significant legal experience in the 
particular field.124 With regard to habeas corpus, there is no LL.M.125 
or special bar exam126 that can indicate expert knowledge. Thus 
experience, gained through constant and prolonged exposure, is not 
simply the best way but also the only way to gain status as an expert 
on habeas corpus. 
Non-expert staff attorneys are generalists, just like the judges 
they serve.127 When faced with a new case, both must re-familiarize 
themselves with the area of law and the particular issues raised by the 
case.128 Constant and prolonged exposure, however, ensures a certain 
level of immersion that does not require renewing familiarity. New 
knowledge builds on older knowledge, and frequent engagement 
without interruption minimizes the opportunities to forget.129 
Immersion also helps with the added challenges of pro se filings. For 
example, a staff attorney can learn the most common defects and 
advise these petitioners on how to correct their filings.130 
Expert review also ensures that material errors and novel issues 
are caught early in the screening process and that the cases are set on 
the appropriate track.131 It also allows judges to rely on the knowledge 
of specialized staff attorneys and gives them confidence that the staff 
attorneys’ briefings and draft opinions offer correct, fully developed 
 
 124. See George C. Beighley Jr., The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Has It 
Fulfilled Congressional Expectations?, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 671, 676 
(2011) (listing the problems in patent law necessitating the creation of the Federal Circuit).  
 125. For example, one can get an LL.M. in tax law. Taxation LL.M., GEORGETOWN LAW, 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/graduate-programs/degree-
programs/taxation/ [http://perma.cc/8KN3-UF2C]. 
 126. For example, prior to practicing before the U.S. Patent and Trade Office, individuals 
must pass a Registration Examination. See Becoming a Practitioner, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/oed/prct-new/index.jsp [http://perma.cc/
6AV5-HDSX]. 
 127. See Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 7, at 437 (noting that “while pro se prisoner 
cases may raise some repeating claims—often about the conditions of imprisonment—the more 
general category of pro se appeals includes claims from all areas of law”).  
 128. See Holderman & Guren, supra note 38, at 4 (reflecting on the diversity of the federal 
docket and noting the “challenge of learning or renewing [his] acquaintance with each specific 
area of the law in which [he] must become adept to resolve each case”). The adage “use it or 
lose it” is also applicable.  
 129. See supra Part I.A.  
 130. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 108, at 70, 96, 108 (describing the different practices of 
the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits in giving “direction” to pro se litigants, including phone 
conversations, in-person meetings, and permitting informal briefing). 
 131. Levy, Judging Justice, supra note 7, at 2410–11 & n.127.  
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analyses.132 Because the very purpose of staff attorneys is to ease the 
judges’ workload, it is important that judges not feel the need to redo 
a staff attorney’s work in every instance. Whereas frequent mistakes 
by non-expert staff attorneys will significantly disrupt this 
relationship, the rare mistake by the expert staff attorney is unlikely 
to do so. 
Although screening and developing of habeas cases for 
nonargument adjudication is fraught with problems when performed 
by non-expert staff attorneys, such practices can materially benefit 
judges when performed by expert staff attorneys well versed in 
federal habeas law. 
B. The Current System 
Screening mechanisms developed by the circuit courts vary, but 
no court currently has formal positions for staff attorneys specializing 
in federal habeas review of noncapital state-court convictions.133 
Although all circuits screen pro se cases for nonargument review as 
an initial matter,134 with the exception of the Tenth135 and Second 
 
 132. See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case 
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 331–32, 353 (2011) (describing how in the 
Fourth Circuit, where there is some de facto specialization of staff attorneys, “judges may also 
decide to request that the case be written up more fully with a memorandum, or even 
calendared, though the latter is rarely done”). 
 133. See generally HOOPER ET AL., supra note 108 (describing the different case-
management practices at the circuit courts, including the specialized positions that currently 
exist in the staff attorney offices). Specifically, the First Circuit has no formal designations, but 
its line staff attorneys “may develop informal temporary specialties in new or discrete areas.” Id. 
at 62. The Fifth Circuit has two assistant case managers who handle all litigation involving 
nondirect, pro se appeals from prisoners and one “generalist/capital case manager” who, in part, 
“handles all aspects of death penalty litigation.” Id. at 110. The Sixth Circuit has a death penalty 
unit and takes advantage of expertise acquired by staff attorneys in particular areas by assigning 
cases “according to their expertise.” Id. at 121. The Ninth Circuit has a “pro se unit.” Id. at 181. 
The Tenth Circuit has attorneys that “specialize in screening cases for jurisdictional defects.” Id. 
at 189. The Eleventh Circuit has three specialized units organized not by subject matter but by 
task: “The Jurisdiction Unit assists the court in the initial review of all appeals filed for the 
purpose of determining appellate jurisdiction. The Issue Tracking Unit tracks and catalogs 
relevant legal issues. The Motions Unit processes certain substantive motions.” Id. at 203.  
  The use of specialized death penalty attorneys or units is notable because it suggests 
that federal appellate courts already recognize the benefits of specialization in this area of law. 
Considering also the overlap between capital and noncapital habeas corpus, see supra notes 77–
82 and accompanying text, creating positions for staff attorneys who specialize in noncapital 
habeas corpus is highly feasible. Some courts may not even require new hiring, but only 
reorganizing of current staff.  
 134. Id. at 51, 64, 89, 101, 111, 122, 137, 152, 181, 204–05 (describing the screening of pro se 
cases by the circuit courts). 
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Circuits,136 pro se appeals cover a wide spectrum of law137 and provide 
little chance for specialization in habeas review.138 Each circuit should 
create, at minimum, one formal position for an expert staff attorney 
who specializes in habeas corpus. Courts with smaller caseloads could 
use this staff attorney’s expertise in both capital and noncapital 
habeas cases.139 If the court’s workload is large enough to justify both 
a noncapital and capital habeas attorney, it should have both. 
Federal appellate courts also currently employ supervisory staff 
attorneys as career attorneys whereas “line staff attorneys” typically 
serve two- to three-year terms.140 When staff attorneys opt to stay 
longer, some circuits expressly limit the number of years they can 
serve.141 The problem with short-term employment is that the first 
year is spent scaling the learning curve so that courts end up serving 
as mere training grounds for these attorneys.142 This means that courts 
reap for only a little while the benefits from the training provided to 
these attorneys and the expertise gained from their experience. The 
specialized staff attorney position, therefore, should be a career 
position as that will ensure that courts retain the benefits of 
experience and expertise gained over time. 
 
 135. The Tenth Circuit’s judges form screening panels and most pro se cases are decided by 
those panels or routed for argument or nonargument review. Id. at 198.  
 136. The Second Circuit only screens pro se prisoner appeals for nonargument. If the pro se 
appeal survives initial review, it is placed on the argument panel’s calendar unless the litigant is 
incarcerated. Id. at 75.  
 137. See supra note 127. 
 138. Although the majority of pro se appeals are prisoners’ petitions, HOOPER ET AL., supra 
note 108, at 38, this is a very broad category covering capital and noncapital habeas corpus, 
motions to vacate sentences, civil rights and prison condition claims, and others. See supra note 
83 (breaking down the composition of “prisoner petitions” arising from federal district courts).  
 139. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. 
 140. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 108, at 12. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have changed 
this practice recently to permit career positions to be offered to “specific” line staff attorneys. 
Id. 
 141. Id. at 12 n.9 (“For example . . . the Ninth Circuit has a five-year limit.”).  
 142. See Elizabeth Olson, Corporations Drive Drop in Law Firms’ Use of Starting Lawyers, 
Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 10, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
 com/2014/10/10/corporations-drive-drop-in-law-firms-use-of-starting-lawyers-study-finds [http://
perma.cc/KX22-BKM7] (reporting that corporations are foregoing the services of entry-level 
lawyers who cost less but bill more time than senior-level associates with greater experience).  
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C. Concerns About the Use of Staff Attorneys 
Scholars have heavily criticized the use of staff attorneys and 
other case-management practices.143 The criticisms surrounding staff 
attorneys are that they (1) lack the requisite experience to do the 
job,144 (2) are unlikely to possess the “paradigmatically elite academic 
qualifications” of chamber clerks,145 (3) are “dissatisfied with the tasks 
assigned them,”146 and (4) “share the court’s frustration and distaste 
for” the “unmeritorious appeals” of “indigent prisoners.”147 These 
arguments lack force, however, when the staff attorney position is a 
career post for a staff attorney with an expertise in habeas corpus. 
1. Inexperience.  When term-limited line staff attorneys are 
responsible for reviewing all noncapital habeas corpus claims, their 
inexperience and lack of expertise risks generating inefficiency and 
error.148 The constant turnover ensures that the position is more often 
inhabited by someone with inexperience rather than experience. By 
changing just one of these term-limited positions into a permanent 
post, courts and litigants alike can benefit from the expertise staff 
attorneys will gain through immersion in habeas corpus. 
2. Elite Qualifications and Job Satisfaction.  Many jobs are 
capable of fulfilling basic needs, such as offering job stability and 
guaranteeing a safe work environment and fair work practices. But 
few are capable of fulfilling higher-order needs, such as offering 
prestigious job assignments, job titles that reflect status and expertise, 
and challenging work.149 Better-qualified candidates will have their 
 
 143. See Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 7, at 420 (providing an overview of the 
scholarly response to case-management practices). 
 144. See Pether, supra note 7, at 1492.  
 145. Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys 
Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 27 (2007). Chamber clerks are hired by judges 
individually to assist only them and typically for a one- to two-year period. 
 146. See Pether, supra note 7, at 1492. 
 147. Id. at 1462. A final criticism of the practice arises from the concern that judges will 
come to rely too heavily on staff attorneys and fail to check for errors in staff attorney work 
product. Id. at 1492. Even should this happen, the likelihood of errors in work product prepared 
by expert staff attorneys can be assumed to be lower than the likelihood of errors in work 
product prepared by non-expert staff attorneys. See supra Part III.A.3.  
 148. See supra Parts III.A.1–2.  
 149. See Robert Tanner, Motivation—Applying Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory, 
MANAGEMENT IS A JOURNEY, https://managementisajourney.com/motivation-applying-
maslows-hierarchy-of-needs-theory [http://perma.cc/R3H9-MCYK] (discussing psychologist 
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pick of jobs that satisfy basic needs and, consequently, will be 
attracted to jobs that can satisfy their higher-order needs as well.150 
Although it is unlikely that a career position with a court will draw 
the elite young lawyers who serve judges in their chambers, a 
specialized and permanent position offers job security, as well as the 
prestige associated with identification as an “expert” in a particular 
area of law. Thus, it is more likely to draw better-qualified candidates 
than a term-limited line staff attorney position. 
Moreover, term-limited line staff attorneys perform the most 
frustrating tasks like searching for jurisdictional defects and drafting 
summary dispositions for patently frivolous appeals.151 Specialized 
staff attorneys, on the other hand, would handle more complex 
appeals as they will be able to efficiently and accurately identify 
material errors or novel issues and prepare memos or draft 
dispositions for cases in which familiar, but difficult, issues arise.152 As 
specialized staff attorneys gain in experience, they will be charged 
with greater responsibilities which will increase their job 
satisfaction.153 
3. Frustration and Distaste for Unmeritorious Appeals.  Judges 
are concerned about the significant consumption of scarce judicial 
resources that attends adjudication of frivolous appeals.154 Justice 
Jackson best explained this frustration: “It must prejudice the 
occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless 
ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up 
with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search.”155 Although 
this comment could be applied generally, Justice Jackson was 
referring to habeas petitions specifically. Considering the low rate at 
 
Abraham Maslow’s theory that humans are driven to satisfy five basic needs and applying the 
theory to the employment context).  
 150. See id. (arguing that “[w]ith [basic] needs satisfied, an employee will want his higher 
level needs of esteem and self-actualization met”). 
 151. See Pether, supra note 7, at 1492. 
 152. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 108, at 62 (describing the First Circuit’s practice of 
assigning “difficult circumstances and emergencies” to the “most experienced [staff] 
attorneys”); supra Part III.A.3. 
 153. See N.K. JAIN, 2 ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR 565 (2005) (listing “mentally 
challenging work” as one of the “more important factors conductive [sic] to job satisfaction”). 
 154. See Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 7, at 438 (“Given the courts’ perception of pro 
se appeals, the nonargument treatment of these cases can be understood as part of a larger 
attempt to allocate less judicial attention to classes of cases that are thought to have a higher 
percentage of frivolous claims.”).  
 155. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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which federal courts grant habeas relief today,156 it is no surprise that 
this frustration continues. The judges’ delegation of this work to staff 
attorneys raises the concern that staff attorneys will only come to 
share in this frustration.157 
The rising rate of exonerations suggests that this may be fast 
becoming an outdated concern, if it is not one already. In particular, a 
fundamental shift has occurred since 1953 when Justice Jackson 
voiced his concern: it is no longer a question of if there is a needle, 
but how many. Since the first use of DNA to exonerate an innocent in 
1989158 and the founding of the Innocence Project in 1992 by Barry 
Scheck and Peter Neufeld,159 it has become imprinted in the public 
consciousness that the criminal justice system does not always work, 
that it in fact fails some people spectacularly.160 
Demonstrating this shift is the increase in the number of public 
and private organizations committed to uncovering wrongful 
convictions. These include wrongful conviction clinics working out of 
law schools, local branches of the Innocence Project, state 
commissions and agencies, such as the Florida Innocence Commission 
and the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, and a host of 
media allies.161 As more organizations litigate or expose claims of 
 
 156. Looking at a sample size of over 2000 cases, a study found that only 0.8 percent of 
noncapital habeas corpus claims are granted after appellate review. Nancy J. King, Non-Capital 
Habeas Cases After Appellate Review: An Empirical Analysis, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 308, 310 
(2012). 
 157. See Pether, supra note 7, at 1462 (articulating this concern).  
 158. Fact Sheets – DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/Content/DNA_Exonerations_Nationwide.php [http://perma.cc/KX22-
BKM7].  
 159. About the Innocence Project, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
about [http://perma.cc/J2DW-GSPE].  
 160. Adam Serwer, Americans Think the Criminal Justice System is Racist, BUZZFEED NEWS 
(Sept. 23, 2014, 12:34 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/adamserwer/blacks-whites-criminal-
justice-survey#.hg7Q1j5Kgr [http://perma.cc/5PJ2-NF8P]; Browse Cases – Detailed View, NAT’L 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.
aspx [http://perma.cc/NZ77-JXTZ]. 
 161. See Innocence Network Member Organizations, INNOCENCE NETWORK, http://
innocencenetwork.org/members [https://perma.cc/DM43-GZVN] (listing members in all fifty 
states, including law-school clinics); Criminal Justice Reform Commissions: Case Studies, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 1, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/news-events-
exonerations/criminal-justice-reform-commissions-case-studies [https://perma.cc/4QQ8-L25M] 
(listing various commissions and agencies set up by state legislatures and courts to inquire or act 
on wrongful convictions). Consider also the ten years spent by the documentarians of Making a 
Murderer to report on Steven Avery’s case, Over 10 Years, 2 Filmmakers Documented the 
‘Making’ of a Murderer, NPR (Jan. 12, 2016, 2:54 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/01/05/
 461908092/over-10-years-two-filmmakers-documented-the-making-a-murderer [https://perma.
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innocence, and on a wider basis than just DNA-based exonerations, it 
is likely that courts and staff attorneys will also start to see a 
corresponding uptick in meritorious claims.  
One new addition to this list of organizations underscores the 
fundamental pivot that Americans have made in their conceptions 
about wrongful convictions: the establishment of Conviction Integrity 
Units (CIUs) in district attorneys’ offices. Prosecutors and law 
enforcement have long maintained an attitude of outright denial or 
refusal to even consider innocence.162 But in 2006, the District 
Attorney for Dallas County, Craig Watkins, set up the nation’s first 
Conviction Integrity Unit.163 Its purpose? Review past convictions and 
identify wrongful convictions of the actually innocent.164 In its first 
four years, the Unit reviewed 300 cases “and led to the exoneration of 
25 wrongfully convicted prisoners.”165 During the past few years, more 
prosecutors’ offices around the country have established these units,166 
and they are looking for more than just DNA-based exonerations.167 
These units demonstrate a marked change in how prosecutors 
perceive wrongful convictions, not only accepting that miscarriages of 
justice may have occurred, but actively seeking them out to correct 
them.  
 
cc/QX8W-2CAM], or the year spent by the producers of the podcast Serial to investigate Adnan 
Syed’s case, Serial: Ep. 01 – The Alibi (Oct. 3, 2014), https://serialpodcast.org/season-one 
[https://perma.cc/8CNC-D67V].  
 162. See Sue Russell, Why Can’t Law Enforcement Admit Their Mistakes?, SALON (Oct. 21, 
2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2012/10/21/why_cant_law_enforcement_admit_their_
mistakes [http://perma.cc/FHQ8-5E7A] (describing prosecutors’ and law enforcement officials’ 
refusal to let go of “their long-held certainty about a suspect’s guilt” even when presented with 
significant evidence to the contrary).  
 163. Justice for All Hearing, supra note 73, at 4.  
 164. Id. ‘Actually innocent’ cases are a subset of wrongful convictions in which evidence 
conclusively establishes that the convicted person did not commit the crime. They do not 
include, for example, cases where the evidence was ultimately found to be insufficient to 
support a conviction, but neither did it prove innocence. See infra note 167. 
 165. Id. 
 166. CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, CONVICTION INTEGRITY UNITS: VANGUARD OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 2–5 (2014) (discussing the sixteen CIUs currently established in 
district attorneys’ offices around the country). 
 167. See Matthew McKnight, No Justice, No Peace, NEW YORKER (Jan. 6, 2015), http://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kenneth-thompson-conviction-review-unit-brooklyn 
[http://perma.cc/45VS-KR3L] (“‘They’re not simply looking at wrongful convictions in cases in 
which a person can prove his or her innocence. They’re also looking at cases where they may be 
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But even a single exoneration is enough for some to know that 
the work is worthwhile. In 2012, North Carolina Superior Court 
Judge Joe Turner oversaw the release of LaMonte Armstrong, who 
had spent nearly seventeen years in jail for a murder he did not 
commit. At the hearing, Judge Turner said that freeing Armstrong 
was the “closest to knowing I’m doing justice, in my career, I will ever 
experience.”168 
CONCLUSION 
Habeas petitioners and federal courts of appeals both stand to 
gain significant benefits from the specialized review of habeas claims. 
These benefits include accuracy, efficiency, correcting injustice and 
restoring liberty, and renewing public confidence in the criminal 
justice system. The creation of a specialized court of appeals would 
require congressional leadership and approval, which is unlikely in 
light of the competing visions for the scope of federal habeas review. 
Review by specialized staff attorneys, however, is an option that 
courts can implement today with little additional cost. Not only would 
such review increase the efficiency of the courts’ handling of 
noncapital § 2254 claims, it would also promote accuracy in 
identification of novel issues and material errors. Moreover, 
specialization among staff attorneys minimizes or eliminates many of 
the criticisms lobbed at appellate courts’ use of them. 
The minimal changes recommended in this Note—establishing at 
least one formal post for a staff attorney who will be responsible for 
primarily reviewing noncapital § 2254 claims, and turning it into a 
career position as opposed to a two- to three-year term-limited 
position—could have a strong positive impact on the likelihood that 
wrongfully convicted prisoners will see justice. At any rate, these 
changes will ensure that courts give habeas petitions the due care and 
attention they require.  
 
 168. See supra note 93. 
